Women of Morocco: Rise of Feminism in an Authoritarian & Patriarchal Regime

Over the last twenty years, Morocco has engaged in a variety of efforts to portray itself as a progressive Middle Eastern country in the area of establishing equality for women. These efforts have included the ratification (without reservations) of the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 2008, reforms in the Moudawana (Personal Status Code) in 2004, and the adoption of a new constitution in 2011. Morocco’s efforts in law, however, have not translated into true equality for women in fact. This disconnect between what is on paper and what daily life is like for the women in Morocco is due in no small part to the continuing use of interpretations of Islam to reinforce Islamic-defined gender roles, the authoritarian rule of a patriarchal monarchy, and a repeated and continuing failure to enforce the laws meant to promote equality for women.

Demographics

Morocco borders the Atlantic Ocean on the northern tip of Africa. In 2015, its population stood at 34,377,511 while 27.2% were both females and males, under the age of fifteen (The World Bank, 2017). During the same year, roughly 60% of Moroccan citizens lived in urban areas, while the remaining 40% inhabited more rural areas (The World Bank, 2017). Females represented 50.6% of the total population, and literacy rates among them ages fifteen and older were at 62% (The World Bank, 2017). The life expectancy at birth for females was last updated in 2014, reflecting a long life of seventy-five years. The crude birthrate in 2014 was roughly 20 live births (per 1,000 people) (The World Bank, 2017). The infant mortality rate the same year was 24.6 deaths (per 1,000 live births) (The World Bank, 2017). The total births per woman were two and a half translating into an average family size of four (The World Bank, 2017). In addition, there was not available data for the mean age of the first marriage for males in Morocco. However, in 2005, twenty-six was the age women entered their first marriage (Gapminder World, 2017).

When examining women (ages fifteen and older), employed in the industries that make up Morocco’s economy, there are three different sectors to examine: agriculture, service, and industry. According to The World Bank, the most current data reflects their employment during 2012. Of the total population during that year, 22.3% were females (ages fifteen and older) employed in the labor force, roughly 7,256,521 people (The World Bank, 2017). Women in the same age group dominated the agricultural sector with 59.9% employment, the services sector made employed 27.9%, and the industries sector a mere 12.1% (The World Bank, 2017). The Gross National Income (GNI) [1] per capita for Morocco in 2015, based on the Atlas method in US$ was $3,030 (The World Bank, 2017).

Morocco’s citizens are educated through primary, and secondary schools. The ratio of female to male enrollment was .89% in 2007[2]. By the year 2014 the country reached .99%, which is the closest they have come to reaching educational enrollment equality between genders (UNESCO, 2017) in its history. Marital and familial gender roles in Morocco have deep roots both in religious culture and in societal values. In the eyes of many scholars, Morocco’s King has skillfully managed to create a progressive image of Morocco for the rest of the world while maintaining a society that remains oppressive to women in a variety of areas. The King has managed to do this by strengthening traditional patriarchal power through favoring Islamic Shariah law over the more progressive provisions of the CEDAW, reformed Family Code, and the 2011 constitution.

Morocco ratified the CEDAW in June of 1993, during the reign of King Hassan II (1961-1999), the father to the present King Muhammad VI. When Hassan II ratified the CEDAW, he entered a reservation for Article Sixteen because its provisions conflicted with Islamic Shariah law (Elliot, 2014). Article Sixteen of the CEDAW, grants equal rights and responsibilities to women for a number of different aspects of marriage and relationships within the family, including, but not limited to, choosing a spouse, ending a marriage, property rights, parental rights of children (regardless of marital status) and deciding on how many children to have and the type of education they receive (United Nations, 2003). By using Islamic law as a way to reserve specific rights of independence to males within Moroccan society, Hassan II was defying a core Article that was the purpose behind this International document.

Changes made to the Moudawana in 2004 included increasing the minimum age for marriage for women (from fifteen to eighteen years old), adding restrictions on polygamy, and giving additional responsibilities and power to the Judiciary system when deciding cases regarding divorce, child custody, and property rights (Zoglin, 2009). Essentially, the courts became the deciding factor on many issues regarding women’s rights. Thus, many judges based their decisions on personal values of protecting the family unit, by restricting rights and citing religious laws (Zoglin, 2009). Originally, the Moudawana was reformed to ensure equality by giving the power to the court, however, by neglecting to spell out specific rights for women, and shifting power to the Judiciary, the King sidestepped any significant forward progress for women in the private sphere.

Politics & Religious Authority

Morocco is unique in that its political system is both authoritarian and electoral. The King holds the ultimate power as the monarch wielding both religious and political authority, yet the country also holds elections for Parliament seats. Moroccan Kings have a pattern of using their own form of ‘Moroccan Islam’ as a form of political and social control. For example, by teaching the Quar’an and applying its principle’s to the Moudawana, both boys and girls are taught at an early age to abide by traditional social roles (Kirdis, 2015). In 2004 when there was a rise of radical opposition to his teachings, then King Mohammad VI formed a “Supreme Council of the Ulama,” (pg. 72) a group of religious dignitaries, to shut down various mosques in areas the council found to be suspicious of radical Islamic extremism (Kirdis, 2015). This council continues to hold significant authority today.

Since gaining independence from France in 1956, Moroccan elections have involved multiple parties having divided representation in Parliament (Pellicer & Wegner, 2015). Morocco’s Parliament however is not an independent body nor is it truly representative of the people. By using both the carrot and the stick, Morocco’s King has managed to control the Parliament: the King rewards loyalty with wealth and access and threatens those opposed to him with violence (Kirdis, 2015). In effect, Parliament does what the King wants. It ensures his ability to squash movements that threaten his power and to pass measures that strengthen his authoritarian grip on the country.

The King’s exerts further control via key parties formed by those closest to the King. For example, the Mouvement Populaire “MP” was established to reach the elite rural nobility and the Rassemblement National des Independants “RNI,” was granted unprecedented access to the King, since their founding member was the brother-in-law to King Hassan II (Pellicer & Wegner, 2015). Although originally formed to promote social justice, the Islamist Justice and Development Party (known by its French acronym, PJD) have since joined the RNI and MP as a supporter of the King. To reward their loyalty and as a result of the Arab Spring elections in 2011, they continue to hold the most seats in Parliament (Pellicer & Wegner, 2015). The Independence Party, known as Istiqlal, is an offshoot of the PJD and is the largest of the opposition parties against the King in Parliament (Pellicer & Wegner, 2015).

Rise of Feminism in Morocco

Women were granted the right to vote in 1959, three years after Morocco gained independence from France (Ramirez, Soysal, & Shanahan, 1997). Since then Moroccan feminist non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have made it their mission to improve, promote, and implement clear objectives that further female participation socially, politically, and economically. In 1997, a group of women’s organizations lobbied and addressed the parties in Parliament proposing a party quota of 20-30% (women only) representation. That same year two women were elected to the Parliament (Darhour & Dahlherup, 2013). After the Arab Spring elections of 2011, the amount of participation for women in legislature dramatically increased.

To gain widespread participation in elections and portray an heir of democracy, in 2002, then King Muhammad VI agreed to drop the voting age from twenty to eighteen, along with implementing new principles for gender quotas to allow participation for women in politics (Darhour & Dahlherup, 2013). By 2002, thirty-five women were elected to Parliament, and in 2011 that number almost doubled to sixty seven, in total (Darhour & Dahlherup, 2013). Today, eighty-one women are represented in Parliament (Ennaji, 2016). These slight increases show the dedication and force of the feminist movement within Morocco. Even though representation is still dominated by males, participation among women is trending upward.

February 20th, 2011 is a significant date for women in Moroccan society. It symbolizes the beginning of a movement (February 20 Movement “F20M”) that mobilized thousands of women across the country to protest against the power of the patriarchal regime (Errazzouki, 2013). Similar uprisings occurred throughout the Arab world that resulted in massive shifts in power. This is commonly referred to as the Arab Spring. In neighboring countries, Libya and Tunisia such movements were successful in toppling their prospective regimes, however Morocco was an exception. Because of King Muhammad VI’s swift action to meet demands of the movement and form a new constitution in 2011, that shifted most of his power to a council that he appointed, his regime survived (Errazzouki, 2013).

On February 21, 2011, Fadoua Laroui, a single mother, set herself on fire in front of a state municipal building, outside of Casablanca after she was denied on her application for public housing (Errazzouki, 2013). Fadoua was a victim of the cultural beliefs of male superiority rooted in the Moudawana. Equality in property rights was dependent on marriage unions (Errazzouki, 2013). She was unmarried and therefore the state saw her as unfit for independent public housing. She had no direct involvement with the official F20M, but some believe it was after this personal display of utter defeat and continued marginalization that the movement gained massive ground.

Three months later, a video was released on social media platforms that sent shockwaves throughout the country and parts of the world. It depicted a police officer violently beating a working-class woman who was carrying her child. She continued to defy the police by refusing to submit and they continued to beat her, with a child in her arms (Errazzouki, 2013). This video and this woman threatened the regime in a couple different ways. First, she was a woman attending an anti-government rally, which was viewed as a form of rebellion against the political order. Second, the visual representation of a violent state authority figure inflicting powerful blows on an unarmed woman clearly defined cultural pressures of defined gender roles between the two sexes. Third, it cemented publicly that men remain the central point in Moroccan society, while women continue to be violently overpowered and oppressed by a culture of male dominance.

About a year later, sixteen year old Amina Filali ate enough rat poison to kill herself, after being forced to marry the man who raped her. When Amina approached the court with a complaint about the rape, the judge cited Article 475 in the penal code (Errazzouki, 2013). According to Article 475, if a man kidnaps a minor, and then enters into a marriage with her, he cannot be punished for his crime until after the divorce is finalized (Errazzouki, 2013). This case earned massive publicity and gathered supporters from citizens and a political party called the Union d’Action Feminine (UAF). This ultimately led to abolishment of the Article entirely. This was good news, however the movement died there and neglected to address the underlying societal norms that perpetuate a culture addicted to shaming woman.

These three women reflect the constant struggle of working-class women in modern day Morocco. Through the years, feminist advocacy groups, NGOs, and the women of Morocco, have all been challenged by the traditional and religious traditions of gender roles deeply engrained in Morocco’s history. Through steps taken by the authoritarian regime, in both religious and political actions, the status of women and their independent rights remains dependent on a union of marriage. Thus, the progressive image of establishing equality for women in Morocco is but a facade.

References

Darhour, H. & Dahlerup, D. (2013). Sustainable Representation of Women through Gender Quotas: A Decade's Experience in Morocco. Women's Studies International Forum, 41(1), 3-7. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.wsif.2013.04.008

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Ennaji, M. (2016). Women, Gender, and Politics in Morocco. Social Sciences, 5(4), 3-7. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/socsci5040075

Errazzouki, S. (2013). Working-class Women Revolt: Gendered Political Economy in Morocco. The Journal Of North African Studies, 19(2), 260-263. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2013.858033

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Pellicer, M. & Wegner, E. (2015). The Justice and Development Party in Moroccan Local Politics. The Middle East Journal, 69(1), 33-36. http://dx.doi.org/10.3751/69.1.12

Ramirez, F., Soysal, Y., & Shanahan, S. (1997). The Changing Logic of Political Citizenship: Cross-National Acquisition of Women's Suffrage Rights, 1890 to 1990. American Sociological Review, 62(5), 744. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2657357

The World Bank. (2017). World Development Indicators| World DataBank. Databank.worldbank.org. Retrieved 1 February 2017, from http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&series=SE.ENR.PRSC.FM.ZS&country=

UNESCO. (2017). Morocco | UNESCO UIS. Uis.unesco.org. Retrieved 1 February 2017, from http://uis.unesco.org/country/ma

United Nations. (2003). CEDAW 29th Session 30 June to 25 July 2003. Un.org. Retrieved 5 February 2017, from http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm

Zoglin, K. (2009). Morocco’s Family Code: Improving Equality for Women. Human Rights Quarterly, 31(4), 978-980. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/hrq.0.0121

[1] The GNI (formally known as GNP per capita)

[2] Taking the total gross enrollment in both primary and secondary schools of females and dividing that by the total gross enrollment of males is how to calculate the ratio. A ratio lower than one percent suggests gender disparities in educational enrollment (The World Bank, 2017).

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